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BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF SoUTH AFRICA

Richard A. Gitlin & Timothy B. DeSieno*

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the economy of the Republic of South Africa has
undergone a difficult transition. I Although the economy is driven by welldeveloped industrial, commercial, and agricultural sectors, 2 it has grown

at a sluggish pace, and the growth has been marked by high levels of
unemployment.
It is in the context of this economic environment that the Heavy Duty

Equipment Manufacture Company ("Heavy Duty"), a privately owned
company formed under the Companies Act No. 61 of 19734 (as amended,
the "Companies Act"), is currently facing financial difficulties. Heavy

Duty specializes in manufacturing heavy industrial machinery, and it has
had a difficult time due to a slow down in orders for new equipment.
Indeed, the balance sheet of Heavy Duty indicates that the company is
insolvent, with a negative equity of $1.75 million . The members (the
registered shareholders) of Heavy Duty are unwilling to provide further
* Mr. Gitlin is a founding member of the Hartford, Connecticut law firm of Hebb &
Gitlin. Mr. DeSieno is an associate at Hebb & Gitlin. The authors gratefully
acknowledge the assistance and practical advice of Anthony J. Smits in preparing this
article.
1. The focus of this discussion will be on the bankruptcy laws of the Republic of South
Africa. The bankruptcy/insolvency laws in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe are substantially similar to those in South Africa.
2. Industrial production accounts for forty percent of GDP, while agriculture accounts
for five percent of GDP. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 390
(1995).
3. In the last few years, the economy absorbed less than five percent of the more than
300,000 workers entering the labor force annually. See id. at 390; see generally PRICE
WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 15-17 (1991).
4. § 1 etseq. of Companies Act, No. 61 of 1973 (BSRSA 1994)(S.Afr.)(as amended)
[hereinafter Companies Act].
5. According to the balance sheet, the total asset value of Heavy Duty is $7.75 million
and the total liabilities amount to $9.5 million.
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capital, and the creditors are concerned that the business cannot survive or
even compete with other firms in the industry in light of its financial
problems.
The following discussion will focus on how the South African
bankruptcy process works in cases of companies in Heavy Duty's position.
U. STRUCTURIS AVAILABLE
FOR RELIEF OF INDEBTEDNESS

In South Africa, relief from indebtedness for companies is governed
by the Companies Act.6 Under the Companies Act, such relief can take
three forms: (i) liquidation (known in South Africa as "winding-up") either
by order of the court or by voluntary resolution of members, (ii)
reorganization by means of a court-sanctioned "compromise" or
"arrangement," and (iii) operation of the company's business underjudicial
7
management.
A. Winding-up

The most common form of debt relief in South Africa is a winding-up
via court order, and the winding-up proceeding is ordinarily commenced
by a creditor or a group of creditors.8 Of course, the Companies Act also
provides that the members can voluntarily wind-up the affairs of the
business.'
In order to commence a winding-up proceeding in court, creditors,
members, or Heavy Duty itself would file an application in the provincial
or local division of the Supreme Court, and the court would decide whether
the petition states sufficient grounds for liquidation.'l For creditors, Heavy

6. See Companies Act § 1 et seq.
7. Although bankruptcy procedures for a company are largely governed by the
Companies Act, procedures for ari individual or partnership are governed by the Insolvency
Act No. 24 of 1936 (as amended). See generally § I et seq. of Insolvency Act No. 24 of
1936 (JSRSA 1995)(S.Afr.)(as aniended) [hereinafter Insolvency Act]. The Companies Act
states, however, that certain provisions of law relating to insolvency apply mutatis
mutandis to any matter not specifically provided for by the Companies Act. Companies
Act § 339. For example, the order of priorities established by sections 95 through 104 of
the Insolvency Act applies to a company's bankruptcy. Insolvency Act §§ 95-104.
8. Companies Act § 343.
9. Id. §§ 343(2)(b), 346(c).
10. See D.H. BOTHA ET AL., CORPORATE LAW 1 30.09, 30.23-30.58 (H.S. Cilliers &
M.L. Benade eds., 1987) [hereinafter CORPORATE LAW].
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Duty's inability to pay debts would serve as the primary ground on which
a final liquidation order would be issued."
As soon as the court issued a winding-up order, Heavy Duty would no
longer be under the control of its managing directors, but would be in the
hands of a Master 2 until a provisional liquidator is appointed.' 3 The
provisional liquidator would preside over the affairs of the company until
a final liquidator is appointed.' 4 After the appointment of a provisional
liquidator, the Master would convene a meeting of creditors and a separate
meeting of members for the purpose of nominating the final liquidator. 5
If different persons are nominated in the
separate meetings, the Master
6
appointment.
decisive
the
make
would
In practice, the Master regularly appoints as liquidator the person
whom the secured creditor supports. Given the prevalence of secured
credit, the secured creditor would ordinarily hold enough debt to control
the creditors' vote. Once appointed, the liquidator, operating in the name
of the company, takes possession of the assets, collects debts of the
company, pays creditors, and distributes any remaining surplus pro rata
among the members.' 7 Once the process of liquidation is complete, the
company is dissolved.' 8
South African secured creditors of course have enforcement
mechanisms other than liquidation available to them under the terms of
their contracts and under applicable law. However, these remedies
typically include the filing of a summons in an attempt to reach a
judgment. The debtor can often successfully delay the summons process,

11. A company may be wound up by the court if it is unable to pay its debts.
Companies Act § 344(f). A company is deemed to be unable to pay its debts if (1) the
company neglects, after receiving a demand for payment, to pay or secure the debt to the
"reasonable satisfaction of the creditor;" (2) a judgment is returned by the sheriff because
the sheriff did not find enough "disposable property" to fully satisfy that judgment; or (3)
the court finds that the company is unable to pay its debts. Id. § 345; see also CORPORATE
LAW, supra note 10, 30.36.
12. Companies Act § 429. "Master" is defined as a court-appointed official charged
with administering the bankruptcy proceedings. Id. § 1.
13. Id. § 429. Appointment is usually within twenty-four hours of the entry of an order
for relief. CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10, 31.08; see also Companies Act

§ 429.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10,
Id. 31.05.
Id. 31.10.
Companies Act § 391.
Id. § 419.

31.08.
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and it can be quite a while before the creditor obtains judgment.
Accordingly, in practice, creditors (at least those whose debts are not the

subject of a bona fide dispute) normally prefer to place the debtor into
liquidation proceedings.
B. Reorganization
The second form of relief is a reorganization under section 311 of the
Companies Act.' 9 Although relatively rarely used, section 311 provides a

19. Id. § 311. Section 311 provides, in relevant part, that:
"(1) Where any compromise or arrangement is proposed between a
company and its creditors.

. .

or between a company and its members. .

.,

the

Court may ... order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, or of the
members of the company or class of members .. to be summoned in such
manner as the Court may direct.
(2) If the compromise or arrangement is agreed to by
(a) a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of
the creditors or class of creditors; or
(b) a majority representing three-fourths of the votes
exercisable by the members or class of members,
(as the case may be) present and voting either in person or by proxy at the
meeting, such compromise or arrangement shall, if sanctioned by the Court, be
binding on all the creditors or the class of creditors, or on the members or class
of members (as the case may be) and also on the company or on the liquidator
if the company is being wound up or on the judicial manager if the company
is subject to a judicial management order....
(4) If the compromise or arrangement is in respect of a company being
wound up and provides for the discharge of the winding-up order or for the
dissolution of the company without winding up, the liquidator. . . shall lodge
with the Master a report in terms of section 400(2) and a report as to whether
or not any director or officer ... is or appears to be personally liable for

damages or compensation to the company or for any debts or liabilities ...
under any provision of this Act, and the Master shall report thereon to the
Court.
(5) The Court, in determining whether the compromise or arrangement
shoutd be sasnctiGoned or net, shalt have regard to the ttumber of members or
members of a class present or represented at the meeting referred to in
subsection (2) voting in favour of the compromise or arrangement and to the
report of the Master referred to in subsection (4)....
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great degree of flexibility in designing reorganizations, which may include
compromises with creditors and more broad-sweeping arrangements in
which a company's capital structure is restructured through a composition
or arrangement. 20 The reorganization can include a merger or a take-over,222'
and creditors can be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the company.
Quite often, a reorganization is proposed and implemented by parties who
have purchased some or all of the claims against the company. Heavy
Duty could select any one or more of these options in seeking to assemble
and propose a reorganization.
Procedurally, in cases such as Heavy Duty's, a reorganization can only
be proposed after the commencement of winding-up proceedings. Once
such proceedings have commenced (i.e., once the court enters an order for
relief), there is a stay against creditor actions.2 3 The stay affords an
opportunity for any interested party to propose a reorganization for Heavy
Duty. The proponent of the reorganization for Heavy Duty would submit
its proposal to the liquidator who would seek to determine whether Heavy
Duty's creditors and members would support the proposal. If the liquidator
believed that enough parties would vote for the proposal, he would present
it to the court. If the court agreed that the prescribed majority of interested
parties were going to accept the proposal, it would order a vote. 24 The
court would order the liquidator to convene a meeting of creditors and a
meeting of members at which the parties will vote on the proposal.25 If the
proposal divides creditors and members into various classes, then each
class must have a separate meeting. 6

(8) In this section 'company' means any company liable to be wound up
under this Act and the expression 'arrangement' includes a reorganization of the
share capital of the company by the consolidation of shares of different classes
or by the division of shares into shares of different classes or by both these
methods."

Id.
20. See CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10, 21.08.
21. See 1 HENOCHSBERG ON THE COMPANIES ACT 604 (Philip M. Meskin et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter HENOCHSBERG].
22. Id.
23. CORPORATE

30.22.
LAW, supra note 10,
24. Id. 21.14.
25. Companies Act § 311(1).
26. See HENOCHSBERG, supra note 21, at 609. Classification is first based on the
dissimilarity of rights and obligations, and secondly on the basis of "common interests."
21.09, 21.10. Creditors, for example, are often

See CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10,

classified into "secured," "preferent," or "concurrent" classes, which is the order of priority
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A class of creditors accepts the scheme if a majority in number
representing three-fourths of value of those present (or voting by proxy)
vote in favor of it.27 A class of members accepts the scheme if threefourths of the votes exercisable by those present (or voting by proxy) vote
in favor of it.28 If a class does not accept the proposal, it cannot be
imposed upon the class. However, rejection of the proposal by a class
does not preclude acceptance by other classes and the proponent may still
seek to implement the terms of a proposal that govern the claims (or
interests) of accepting classes.
No proposal to reorganize Heavy Duty would be binding on any party
until the court sanctioned it. The court's decision to sanction a proposal
is guided, in part, by the Master's report and by the results of the classes'
votes.2 9 The court does not merely rubber stamp the decision of the voting
parties. Rather, it too must be satisfied that the proposal should be
approved. In analyzing this issue, the court would consider whether the
proposal is reasonable and fair, whether the parties who considered the
proposal were adequately represented, whether such parties had adequate
information on which to base their decisions, etc.30 one the covurt
sanctioned the proposal, it would be binding on all parties in the classes
who accepted it, including parties who voted to reject and those who did
not vote.3 '
C. Judicial Management
The third form of relief is that of judicial management. A creditor,
member, or Heavy Duty itself can petition the court to grant an order that
vests management control in the hands of a judicial manager, who operates
the company's business under the supervision of the Master.3 2 The court
will grant such an order if (i) mismanagement is found to be a major factor
in Heavy Duty's inability to pay debts, and (ii) there is a "reasonable
probability" that, if placed under judicial management, Heavy Duty will be
able to meet its obligations and become a successful concern. 3 Judicial

under the Insolvency Act. Id. 21.12. These terms will be discussed further in part III.
27. Companies Act § 311(2).

28. Id.
29. See id. § 311(5).

30. See HENOCHSBEG, supra note 2t, at 622-23.
31. Companies Act § 311(7).
32. Id. at 429.

33. CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10,

29.08.

1997]

SOUTH AFRICAN BANKRUPTCY LA WS

289

management is similar in many respects to Chapter I I of the United States
Bankruptcy Code, inasmuch as it provides a company a chance to obtain
a relatively longer stay against creditor action and an opportunity to
restructure its business.34 Judicial management is rarely used in South
Africa, however, given, among other things, the requirement that the
company must quickly be able to satisfy its existing obligations as they
become due.3 5 Such a requirement normally requires the support of a
significant source of financing for troubled companies, which is not
ordinarily available in South Africa.
Of course, Heavy Duty can agree with its creditors on an out-of-court
While an out-of-court agreement has its
reorganization as well.
advantages, including increased speed and lower cost, practical reality in
South Africa makes such agreements relatively rare and relatively shortterm when they do exist. For example, fraud in business remains a
significant problem in South Africa.3 6 Consequently, creditors are
generally concerned that their borrower may be misleading them and that
they may not be sufficiently informed about the borrower's true financial
condition to enter into an out-of-court agreement. Instead of assuming
these risks, creditors would prefer to place their debtors into bankruptcy if
they are not receiving payment.
On the other hand, upon the commencement of bankruptcy
proceedings, a liquidator is immediately appointed. The liquidator is a
professional whose name must appear on the official list of professionals
admitted to act in such capacity,3 7 and is vested with significant and
powerful investigatory responsibilities. 38 The liquidator typically examines
the debtor under oath soon after the entry of an order for relief. To date,
persons under interrogation have not been able to invoke their privilege
against self-incrimination, although their statements have been deemed
made in camera and have not been disclosed to prosecutors. 39 The

34. See generally II U.S.C. § 362 (1995).
35. See CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10, 9129.33.
36. John Mason, News: International:Big company frauds detected only by chance, FIN.
TIMES, May 17, 1996, at 3 (citing the Ernest & Young 1996 International fraud Survey).

37. See

CORPORATE LAW,

supra note 10, 1 31.08.

38. Companies Act § 386.
39. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 4, §§ 25(2)(c), 3(d)(interim constitution)(as amended), repealed
by Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (JSRSA 1996)(effective
Jan. 1, 1998). Given South Africa's recent adoption of a written constitution incorporating
a bill of rights, however, South African courts are currently struggling with the
constitutionality of this provision. A Constitutional Struggle, LAW INT'L, June 1995, at
6, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
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examination covers all aspects of the debtor's business and financial
affairs, and provides all interested parties with a much clearer picture of
the company's financial position than they could have had beforehand.
Creditors in South Africa generally prefer to negotiate a reorganization (or
simply pursue a liquidation) based upon such information.
In South Africa, creditors, particularly large secured creditors,
ordinarily are in a position to determine whether a company in financial
difficulty can negotiate such an out-of-court restructuring and, if
bankruptcy proceedings are commenced, to select the form of debt relief.
If a creditor is not receiving payment from its debtor, and the creditor
believes that it is better to liquidate the debtor's assets rather than enter
into a compromise or other out-of-court agreement with the company, the
creditor can file a petition seeking to commence liquidation proceedings. 0
Once the court enters an order for relief and the Master convenes the first
creditors' meeting, the large secured creditor can significantly influence the
nomination of a liquidator. The winding-up process could then proceed to
resolution as the creditor desired. However, if the company or a thirdparty "rescuer" proposes a reorganization, the large secured creditor will
either have a significant vote in considering the plan (if all creditors are
classified together) or be able to veto the proposal as it affects the secured
creditor's claim (if the secured creditor is in a class of its own). 4'
In the case of Heavy Duty, the bank lenders, hold claims of sufficient
value (approximately 53% of the total liabilities) to thwart any proposed
reorganization, even assuming all of the creditors are grouped into one
class.42
Even if all 50 suppliers voted in favor of the proposal
(representing a majority of creditors in number), they would lack the
requisite claim value to meet the provisions of section 311 of the
Companies Act. Indeed, in Heavy Duty's situation, the bank lenders
(depending on the extent and nature of their collateral) would likely choose
to liquidate their collateral, and no party would likely be able to stop them.

1Il.

PLAYERS INVOLVED IN OBTAINING RELIEF

The court plays a significant supervisory role in each of the various
forms of relief. The court of course plays a critical role in deciding

40. See generally Companies Act §§ 343, 346.
41. Insolvency Act § 119(7); see CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10, 21.14.
42. According to the balance sheet, the bank lenders hold $5 million in claims; the
suppliers hold $3 million; retirees hold $250,000; the taxing authorities hold $1 million;
and the owners hold $250,000.
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whether to grant an order that initiates a winding-up proceeding. If a
reorganization is proposed under section 311 of the Companies Act, the
court determines whether the proposal should go to a vote. The court also
has the final say in deciding whether to sanction the proposal. In the case
of judicial management, the court generally supervises the operation of the
company and determines whether the company is likely to be able to meet
all of its existing obligations.
The role of the Master is to assist the court in the administrative
aspects of supervising the proceedings, both in the case of winding-up
proceedings and judicial management.4 3 For example, once the court issues
a final liquidation order," the Master is the first person who seizes control
of the company and summons the first meetings of creditors and members
where a liquidator is appointed. 5 The Master is ultimately responsible for
the appointment of a liquidator. 6 However, even after a liquidator is
appointed the Master retains a supervisory role, making sure that the
liquidator is properly performing his or her duties.4 7 In the case of judicial
management, it is the Master who actually supervises the judicial manager
in the day-to-day management of the company."
Other than in the case of judicial management, where the judicial
manager and the Master are by far the most significant players, the
liquidator is the most important player in South African bankruptcy
9
proceedings. The liquidator is selected at the first meeting of creditors,
50
and presides over all such meetings thereafter. In the case of a windingup, the liquidator is charged with collecting the company's assets, reducing
them to money, and distributing the money to creditors and members in
accordance with the statutory provisions.5 ' In the case of a proposed
reorganization, the liquidator is charged with (i) circulating the proposal
and all relevant information to creditors, and (ii) presiding over the meeting
at which parties in interest vote on the proposal and reporting the results
of the voting to the court.5 2 Further, if a reorganization is accepted by the

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Companies Act § 1.
Id. § 427.
See id. §§ 369, 429.
Id. §§ 379, 438(3).
See id. § 381; see CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10, 1 31.19.

48. Companies Act § 428(3).
49. Id. § 369.

50. Id. § 386.
Id. § 391.
52. See id. § 312; see also CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10, 1 21.14.
51.
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parties in interest and sanctioned by the court, the court ordinarily appoints
the liquidator as the "Receiver for Creditors," i.e., the person charged with
implementing the reorganization.5 3
Regardless of whether a reorganization is proposed, it is the liquidator
who reports to the court and the creditors on the affairs of the company,
contests creditors' claims (which are generally filed at the second meeting
of creditors), and examines the corporate conduct of directors and
officers.54 The liquidator's work also includes pursuing actions to undo
prejudicial transfers of property, fraudulent conveyances, or collusive
disposition of assets.55
Of course, the company's members and creditors are also significant
players in the bankruptcy proceedings, especially if a reorganization is
proposed. Another significant player is the party who proposes any such
reorganization (which may be a third party). Each of these groups
participates in the negotiations that leads to the formation of the proposal.
Then the creditors and the members vote on whether to accept the
proposal.
Each of the players are ordinarily represented by professionals
including attorneys and accountants. Except in the case of the liquidator
and the "liquidating creditor, ' 5 6 the players pay for their professional
The liquidator and the liquidating creditor are
advice themselves.
reimbursed out of the estate for the cost of professional advice in amounts
approved by the court.5 7 The liquidator is also paid out of the estate.58
The amount of the liquidator's fee is regulated by the Insolvency Act.5 9
IV. PRIORrrES AMONG CREDITORS

Claims against a South African insolvent company's estate fall into
one of three general categories: (i) "secured" claims, i.e., claims which are
secured by an interest in property, (ii) "preferent" claims, i.e., claims that

53. See generally Companies Act § 386.
54. See Companies Act §§ 400, 386(4); see also CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10, It
31.26, 31.31.
55. Companies Act §§ 400, 386(4); Insolvency Act, §§ 26(1), 29(1), 30(1), 31(1); see
also CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10, 1 31.54, 31.58-31.61.
56. The "liquidating creditor" is the creditor who successfully commenced the windingup proceedings. See Companies Act §§ 343(2)(a), 346(c).
57. Id. § 384; Insolvency Act § 63.
58. Insolvency Act § 63.
59. Id.

SO UTH AFRICA N BA NKR UPTCY LA WS

1997]

293

are entitled to a payment priority over other claims under applicable South
African law, and (iii) "concurrent" claims, i.e., general unsecured claims. 6
Sections 95 through 104 of the Insolvency Act apply to a company's
bankruptcy and establish the precise priorities of such claims.6' 6The
2
following is a list of the priorities established by the Insolvency Act:
I. Secured claims (including interest on such

63

claims)

II. Preferent claims:
a. Funeral and death-bed expenses'
b. Costs of sequestration (administration66of the estate) 65
c. Costs of execution (against property)

67
d. Statutory obligations (all such claims rank pari passu):
1. Certain amounts due under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, 1941
2. Certain amounts due under the Income Tax Act, 1962
3. Certain amounts due under the Pneumoconiosis Act, 1962
4. Certain amounts due under the Customs and Excise Act,
1964
5. Certain amounts due under the National Supplies
Procurement Act, 1970;
6. Certain amounts due under the Sales Tax Act, 1966
7. Certain amounts due under Value-Added Tax Act, 1991
8. Certain amounts due under the Community Development
Act, 1966
9.Certain amounts due under the Unemployment Insurance
Act, 1966
10. Certain amounts due from an insolvent in its capacity as
an employer, in respect of pension contributions,
medical insurance, sick leave, or other insurance funds

60. See id. § 94.
61. Insolvency Act §§ 95-104.
62. See CATHERINE SMITH,
63. Insolvency Act § 95.
64. Id. § 96.

65. Id. § 97.
66. Id. § 98.

67. Id. § 99.

THv LAW OF INSOLVENCY

239-49 (1973).
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a. Salary or wages of former employees of the
insolvent68
persons or the incomes or profits of
b. Taxes on
69
persons

70
c. Claims secured by a general mortgage bond

II. Concurrent (also called "non-preferent") claims which are timely
proved71
72
IV. Concurrent claims which are proved late

V. TREATMENT OF SECURED CREDITORS

In general, the secured creditor has tremendous control of the
bankruptcy process in South Africa. First, if a secured creditor is not
receiving payment in accordance with its contract, it can place its debtor
into liquidation proceedings in the confidence that neither its claim, nor its
lien or mortgage, will be affected without its consent, at least not for very
long. Despite the automatic stay of all creditor action upon the entry of
an order for relief, the debtor's assets are thereafter liquidated quite
quickly. Second, even if somebody proposes a reorganization, the secured
creditor will be able to veto the proposal in most cases (at least inasmuch
as the proposal purports to affect the secured creditor's claim or collateral)
if it does not find the terms satisfactory. 73 In either event, the secured
creditor will have received the proceeds of its collateral, or will have
agreed to a reorganization it finds satisfactory within a matter of days, or
weeks at most.

For these and several further reasons,, secured creditors generally
prefer bankruptcy proceedings to their non-bankruptcy remedies and outof-court negotiations. First, fraud is prevalent in business, and creditors
benefit from the information-gathering powers of the bankruptcy
liquidator. 74 Second, the foreclosure process is difficult for the secured

68. Id. § 100.
69. Id. § 101.
70. Id. §§ 102, 103(2).
71. Id. § 103.
72. Id. § 104.

73. Id. § 119(7).
74. See generally Mason, supra note 36.
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creditor and is easy for the debtor to delay." Finally, there is no concept
of self-help in the South African system, and the secured creditor's access
to its collateral, even if the collateral is movable property, 76 is only
through a court,77 and can be quite slow.
V1. POTENTIAL PERSONAL LIABILITY

Directors, officers and promoters can be found liable in connection
with the bankruptcy of their company on any of several grounds. Among
the most significant are (i) liability for breach of fiduciary duty (e.g.,
misappropriation of the company's property and other forms of selfdealing), and (ii) liability for fraudulent conduct of business (e.g., intent
to defraud creditors or reckless trading-incurring debts at a time when the
manager knew, or when a reasonable manager should have known, that
such debts could not be repaid). In the former case, the manager can be
ordered to return the property to the company's estate, along with interest
as ordered by the court.78 In the latter case, the manager can be found
liable for some or all of the debts of the company. 9 In both cases, the
manager is subject to criminal investigation, and, if found guilty (especially
of actual fraud), may serve time in jail under applicable criminal law. 0
A director found liable under any of these laws is disqualified from serving
as a director in any company, until such time as a court of competent
jurisdiction orders otherwise. 8 '
It is often the case that the liabilities imposed on a manager under
82
these laws lead to his or her insolvency and the need for "sequestration. ,
However, once the sequestration proceedings have commenced, the
manager is again prohibited from serving in elected office until that
manager is rehabilitated. 3
In this context, the manager can be

75. Id.
76. See generally Insolvency Act. In fact, there is no central filing system for movable
property in South Africa, and creditors are often unsure of who has an interest in which
property of the company.
77. See id. §§ 17, 19.
78. Companies Act § 423.
79. Id. § 424.
80. Id. § 426(1).
81. See id. § 219; CORPORATE LAW, supra note 10, 1 31.71.
82. Insolvency Act § 9. "Sequestration" is the South African term for the liquidation
of the estate of an insolvent natural person. Id.
83. Companies Act § 219.
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rehabilitated only if either the court grants a rehabilitation order84 or ten
years passes after the sequestration of his or her estate."
Nevertheless, with the exception of cases of clear-dealings, in
practice, it is very difficult to prove that managers are liable under these
provisions. The statutes require that the manager be shown to have
engaged in the wrongful or reckless acts "knowingly," 86 a standard which
is quite difficult to meet.

84. Insolvency Act § 129. "Rehabilitation" includes obtaining a discharge for debts
incurred before the sequestration and removal of the prohibitions (such as against serving
as a company's director) that have been imposed. Id.
85. Id. § 127A.
86. Companies Act § 424(3).

